TIME: Almanac 1995

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<text id=90TT2194> <title> Aug. 20, 1990: Me and My Brother Against My Cousin </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1990 Aug. 20, 1990 Showdown </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> THE GULF, Page 33 Me and My Brother Against My Cousin </hdr> <body> The crisis forces Arab leaders to do what they most abhor: take a stand By Jill Smolowe--Reported by Dean Fischer/Cairo, David S. Jackson/ Dubai and James Wilde/Amman Talk of Arab unity has usually been just that--talk. Since the Arab League's founding in 1945 as a loose federation of seven states, issues of wealth, territory, sovereignty and political influence have splintered the alliance. With Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the one issue that had always rallied unanimous support--Arab hatred of the state of Israel--proved divisive too. Through the 1980s, the cleavages seemed only to widen as the members of the Arab League, now 21 strong, lined up on different sides in the Iran-Iraq war and split their loyalties between Washington and Moscow. So Saddam Hussein's precipitous invasion of Kuwait two weeks ago hardly shattered Arab unity. It merely stripped away the flimsy facade of harmony and exposed the Arab League for what it has long been: a group of states with widely differing interests. Thus it came as a welcome surprise when a majority of Arab states voted late last week to commit troops to a pan-Arab force and to honor the worldwide U.N. economic embargo against Iraq. At an emergency session of the Arab League in Cairo, 12 of the 20 delegations agreed "to respond to the request by Saudi Arabia and other gulf states to deploy Arab forces to support the armed forces there." Significantly, their numbers included Egypt and Syria, which have two of the Middle East's largest armies. Algeria and Yemen abstained, while Jordan, Sudan and Mauritania expressed reservations and did not even vote. Iraq of course rejected the package, supported by Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The resolution was weakened by the lack of unanimity and by uncertainty over how it would be implemented. But it was the first time in three decades that an affirmative vote was taken by the Arab League to send troops to repel the aggression of a member nation. The soldiers of the 12 yea-saying states will operate separately from the U.S.-led multinational contingent, though it is expected that the two defense forces will cooperate and perhaps even coordinate their efforts. The eleventh-hour response to Saddam's challenge spoke directly to Arabs' deep-seated fears about Western intervention in the region, reflecting their historic distrust of foreign influences. As Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak cautioned during the summit, "The choice before us is clear: an Arab act that will preserve higher Arab interests or a foreign intervention in which we will have no say or control." Xenophobic passions aside, there was a more practical consideration in the push to establish an Arab peacekeeping force. Moderate Arab leaders, like Mubarak and Jordan's King Hussein, know well that if the showdown in Saudi Arabia begins to look like a conflict that pits the "imperialist" U.S. against a beleaguered Iraq, Arab sympathy will tilt toward Saddam. An Arab proverb instructs that if a Muslim nation invites a foreigner onto its soil to fight, then all other Islamic nations should turn against the renegade nation. Warns a Syrian official: "The Americans should realize that if they hurt Iraq, it will mobilize all the Arabs around Saddam Hussein." Bizarre as it may seem to some Westerners, the prospect of Saddam's emerging as a populist idol is not farfetched. In a region rife with dissolute and spendthrift rulers, he is admired for his austere and disciplined habits. "He has no palaces, no Swiss bank accounts," says Major General Yusuf Kawash, a retired member of the Jordanian army. Saddam has positioned himself as an avenging Robin Hood, intent upon stealing the wealth of the affluent but uncaring gulf states and redistributing it to the impoverished Arab masses. Jordan's Hussein reinforced that reasoning early last week, when he said that the crisis was "redrawing boundaries between the haves and the have-nots." While Saddam stirs fear, he also commands respect. His appetite for provocative and forceful action stands in stark contrast to the vacillating, foot-dragging and facile reversals that characterize the leadership of many other Arab states. His decisiveness appeals to those Arabs who dream of pan-Arab unification and worship Arab dignity. They see in Saddam a modern-day answer to the leadership vacuum opened by the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. They also applaud his unwavering hostility toward those whom he perceives as enemies, especially Israel. "Saddam fulfills the ambitions of the Arab people," says Ahmed al-Yaamani, a businessman who like thousands of other Jordanians, registered last week with a popular committee to fight for Iraq against the U.S. "He is a hero." The last thing the region's rulers want is to hand Saddam a larger platform from which to trumpet his populist message of Arab unity, vengeance and pride. Most Middle Eastern countries are autocratic regimes that rule by vague historic claim or tight control of their armed forces, not by popular consent. The hereditary ruling clans of the gulf states are particularly vulnerable to charges that they preside over artificial entities with little more than their oil wealth to justify their existence. Few men in the street have mourned the demise of Kuwait's al-Sabah family, a clan noted for its extravagant life-style. Discontent over chronic corruption and inefficiency runs high. Shaky Arab regimes are worried that Saddam could mobilize religious and nationalistic passions, then turn that rage against them. Recent events have made it more difficult than ever to achieve Arab unity. There is little room left for the political fence straddling that has maintained a strained peace. The leaders who side with Saddam risk being accused of handing him the keys to the Arab kingdom and losing Western economic and military support. Those who stand against Saddam could be stripped of their nationalist credentials back home, as traitors to the Arab cause--or fall under Saddam's tanks as Kuwait did. The anguish of these leaders was evident as they groped to balance long-term strategic interests against short-term political aims. EGYPT. As the recipient of $2.3 billion annually in U.S. military and economic aid, Egypt was in a difficult position to resist Bush's appeals for support. But that very connection exposes Mubarak to charges that he is an American puppet. He must also juggle domestic considerations. Most Egyptians responded angrily to Saddam's bald annexation of Kuwait. But 1 million of them work in Iraq, 300,000 more in Kuwait, and if Mubarak mishandles the situation, he could put those lives in danger. The day after Saddam moved into Kuwait, Egypt joined the Arab League's belated condemnation of the invasion. But Mubarak, who had just cause for outrage since Saddam had assured him only a week earlier that Iraq had no such intention, did not respond forcefully until after the U.S. pressed Egypt to join a multinational force. "I'm not going to help foreign troops," he declared, "but I will help Arab troops." Even as he called for the emergency Arab summit, however, he authorized U.S. aircraft to fly over Egypt and cleared the way for the U.S.S. Eisenhower to pass through the Suez Canal. If Mubarak was publicly humiliated by his misbegotten assurances that Saddam would not invade Kuwait, he has now redeemed himself by mounting the last-ditch summit and ensuring a pan-Arab presence in Saudi Arabia. JORDAN. Known locally for having "changed his skin a million times," King Hussein is also respected as a canny analyst who understands better than most the shifting sands of the Arab world. If he has frustrated both Arab and Western allies over the years, he has also managed to survive longer than most Mideast leaders. Hussein's relations with Iraq have warmed over the past decade, mainly as a shield against rising fundamentalism and Israel's designs to turn his kingdom into a Palestinian state. He has had to acknowledge the pan-Arabist, anti-U.S. passions of his citizens--at least half of whom are Palestinian--which have only increased as the peace process has stalled. Hussein refused to join the Arab League's original condemnation of Iraq, calling the move premature. "I believe [Saddam] is a person to be trusted and dealt with," he declared. Apparently realizing that he had underestimated Western reaction, Hussein distanced himself from Saddam last week. He stressed that Jordan recognized the ousted government of Kuwait and signed on to U.N. sanctions that will close a vital Iraqi overland route to Jordan's port of Aqaba. He even went so far as to call the escalation toward confrontation the "most dangerous crisis [the region] has ever faced," though he still declined to take a position on last week's summit resolution. SAUDI ARABIA. After decades of relying on caution and massive infusions of money to soothe restive neighbors, Riyadh's room for maneuvering has severely shrunk. King Fahd, who characterized Iraq's adventuring as the "most horrible aggression the Arab nation has known in its modern history," faced a Hobson's choice: he could go it alone, leaving his small and scattered army to answer Iraq's battle-hardened troops, or he could call in the U.S. and lay bare his ties. Courageous as Westerners find him, Fahd can hardly dispute Saddam's charge: "The joint policy with the foreigner has become exposed." Of all the Arab gulf leaders, Fahd is now most vulnerable to charges he is a Western puppet. Shi`ite Muslims have been disputing Saudi custodianship of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina as illegitimate. The presence of foreign forces risks sowing the seeds of long-term agitation to unseat the house of Saud, though the presence of a pan-Arab force will take much of the onus off Fahd. SYRIA. Damascus' support of Tehran during the Iran-Iraq war had virtually consigned Syria to the role of regional pariah. Moscow's economic pullback from the region threatened only to deepen Syria's isolation. By honoring the U.N. embargo and casting its lot with the pan-Arab force, Syria aims to reintegrate into the Arab and international fold. President Hafez Assad has not taken a front role in the current drama, but he did issue an early condemnation of Iraq's action, warning that if other nations pursued a similar course, "the world would resemble a jungle." P.L.O. The failure of the U.S. and Egypt to prod Israel toward a resolution of the almost three-year-old uprising in the occupied territories has pushed the Palestine Liberation Organization tighter into Iraq's embrace. Frustrated Palestinians regard Saddam as the one man willing to do more than mouth empty words for their cause; many have come to regard him as a potential savior. Chairman Yasser Arafat may feel he has little choice but to back Saddam. Still, Arafat will have a tough time explaining his rejection of last week's pan-Arab resolution to his benefactors in the gulf states. Ironically, Israel stands to gain from the tensions. The right-wing government of Yitzhak Shamir is enjoying a reprieve from pressure to join Palestinians at the bargaining table. Shamir's repeated warnings that Saddam is serious in his threats to scorch Israel with chemical weapons are now being taken seriously. If recent events have shattered the myth of Arab unity, they have also raised the prospect of forging a new spirit of cooperation, not only among Arab states but with the outside world as well. Twelve states cast their ballots last week on the side of reason. The effectiveness of their pan-Arab force may determine whether a moderate hand or Saddam's radical fist proves the guiding force in the region. </body> </article> </text>